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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
IN PATERNITY CASES
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Prior to 1968, statutory classifications based on illegitimacy
were not viewed by the Supreme Court as falling within that
group of classifications triggering an intensified equal protection
scrutiny. In that year, the Court in Levy v. Louisiana' found an
equal protection violation in a Louisiana statute which denied
illegitimate children the right to seek recovery for the wrongful
death of their mother. Justice Douglas' opinion, while invoking
rationality review in form, strongly suggested that a closer fit
between the legislative intent and the means selected to execute
that intent was appropriate where illegitimacy was involved.2
Subsequently, the Court extended the equal protection rights of
illegitimate children. Thus, it has been held that the equal pro-
tection clause protects the rights of illegitimate children to share
equally with legitimate children in matters of recovery of work-
men's compensation benefits upon the death of a parent,8 re-
ceipt of state public assistance funds,4 Social Security disability
benefits,5 and inheritance by intestate succession.6
The basic standard of review applied by the Court in re-
viewing such classifications has rested on the premise that ille-
gitimacy is not a "suspect" classification. Thus, the strict scru-
tiny test, which is applied where a fundamental right or
existence of a suspect class is in issue, has not been applied.7
The Court's reasoning was expressed by the majority in Ma-
thews v. Lucas:8 although illegitimacy was a characteristic of
birth dictated by factors not within an individual's control, such
1. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
2. Id. at 71-72.
3. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
4. New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973).
5. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
6. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977), but see Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978),
which upheld a New York statute permitting inheritance where the decedent had died
intestate only where a court of competent jurisdiction had entered an order of filiation.
7. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
8. Id.
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as race or national origin, discrimination against illegitimates
had not reached the degree or pervasiveness of the discrimina-
tion directed at, for example, certain racial or ethnic groups.
Therefore, distinctions based on illegitimacy did not merit the
type of protection from the majoritarian political process that
would trigger strict judicial scrutiny.9 The Court has instead ap-
plied what it terms a "heightened level of scrutiny."1 Briefly
stated, this particular level of scrutiny falls in between the strict
scrutiny test and the minimal scrutiny, or rational basis test,1
which is typically employed to examine equal protection chal-
lenges to economic legislation. 12 This note will examine the pre-
sent status of statutes of limitation as they relate to equal pro-
tection guarantees in paternity litigation.
While all states and uniform acts impose a statutory duty
on parents to support their children, 8 the Supreme Court did
not have the occasion to review the equal protection aspect of a
statutory scheme which granted differing legal rights to legiti-
mate and illegitimate children with respect to enforcement of
that duty until 1973. In that year, the Court, in Gomez v. Pe-
rez, 4 struck down a Texas statute barring illegitimate children
from seeking any support from their natural fathers while ac-
cording such rights to legitimate children until they reached
their majority. In its opinion, the Court stated that a state could
not "invidiously discriminate against illegitimate children by de-
nying them substantial benefits accorded children generally."'"
It went on to hold that where "a state posits a judicially enforce-
able right on behalf of children to needed support from their
natural fathers there is no constitutionally sufficient justification
for denying such an essential right to a child simply because its
9. Id. at 503-06. See also United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
n.4 (1938).
10. Pickett v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 2199, 2204 (1983).
11. The Court's attempts to define intermediate scrutiny in the context of illegiti-
macy have failed thus far to produce a uniform standard. To date, the Court has defined
intermediate scrutiny in negative as well as positive terms. See Pickett, 103 S. Ct. at
2204 (and citations therein).
12. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955), Railway Express Agency
v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
13. See, e.g., UNIF. PATERNITY ACT, §§ 1,2 (1960).
14. 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
15. Id. at 538.
[Vol. II
NOTES
natural father has not married its mother."' 6 Although the Court
was sensitive to the additional evidentiary requirement existing
for illegitimate children seeking support, namely, the additional
step of proving paternity, it stated that that additional require-
ment could not form the basis for "an impenetrable barrier that
works to shield otherwise invidious discrimination. '17 Nine years
later, in Mills v. Habluetzel,'s the Court formulated a test tak-
ing into account the concerns voiced in its holding in Gomez and
the state's interest in avoiding stale and fraudulent claims. The
latter is frequently cited as a motivating factor in imposing a
limitations period for paternity claims.
In Mills, the Court resolved the equal protection analysis
into a two-part test. In order to survive equal protection scru-
tiny, a statutory scheme limiting paternity actions has to "be
sufficiently long in duration to present a reasonable opportunity
for those with an interest in such [illegitimate] children to assert
claims on their behalf" and "any time limitation placed on that
opportunity must be substantially related to the state's interest
in avoiding stale and fraudulent claims."' 9 Measured against this
test, the Court held that Texas' enactment of a statute of limita-
tions requiring that a suit to establish paternity be brought prior
to the child's first birthday, enacted in response to the Court's
decision in Gomez, 0 failed to satisfy either of the two criteria.2'1
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, stated that the
economic, social, and psychological disruption in a mother's life
during the year following the birth of an illegitimate child would
present too great a burden on the mother to allow so brief a time
period in which to file a paternity claim. 23 Additionally, no satis-
factory relationship could be found between a one-year limita-
tions period and the state's interest. As the Court stated, "[w]e
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 456 U.S. 91 (1982).
19. Id. at 99-100.
20. See Texas Department of Human Resources v. Hernandez, 595 S.W.2d 189 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1980).
21. 456 U.S. at 100.
22. All of the justices except for Justice Powell, who concurred separately in the
judgment, joined in the Court's opinion. Justice Powell did, however, join Justice
O'Connor's concurrence. For a discussion of Justice O'Connor's concurrence, see text ac-
companying infra notes 26-31.
23. 456 U.S. at 100.
1984]
HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL
can conceive of no evidence essential to paternity suits that in-
variably will be lost in only one year, nor is it evident that the
passage of 12 months will appreciably increase the likelihood of
fraudulent claims."24 The Court declined, however, to extend
complete equality to illegitimate children seeking support, citing
the additional requirements of proof.25
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor suggested that,
given the criteria upon which the Court invalidated the one-year
statute of limitations, longer limitations periods might also be
unconstitutional. 6 Although the state had argued that it had an
interest in avoiding the litigation of stale and fraudulent claims,
Justice O'Connor believed that this argument was outweighed
by another interest unique to the state itself-the interest of the
state in seeing that all genuine claims for child support are re-
solved. This interest springs from two concerns: first, in ensuring
that judicial process is available to all of its citizens, and second,
the desire of the state to reduce the number of its citizens forced
to become dependent on public assistance.2 7 A one-year limita-
tions period for establishing paternity as a prerequisite for ob-
taining support, Justice O'Connor contended, would actually in-
crease the burden on a state welfare program.2 An additional
factor militating against the state's interest was that Texas did
not toll the statute of limitations during the child's minority in
paternity cases, as it did in the vast majority of all civil actions.
While the Texas legislature saw no overriding evidentiary
problems in allowing an extended time lapse in other types of
actions, paternity was placed in a special category.29 Taken cu-
mulatively, Justice O'Connor expressed grave doubt as to
whether the resulting burden placed on the illegitimate plaintiff
seeking support had any relation to the advancement of a state
interest within constitutional bounds.
In addition, Justice O'Connor noted that certain personal
obstacles preventing the filing of a paternity claim could well
exist several years after the child's birth. She posited two situa-
24. Id. at 101.
25. Id. at 97.
26. Id. at 106 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 103.
28. Id. at 104.
29. Id.
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tions in which these obstacles would bar any judicially enforcea-
ble right of support under the challenged statute: first, if the
mother and the natural father continued their relationship and
the father supported the child, the mother might be reluctant to
file a paternity claim in order to protect her child's right to fu-
ture support if it would endanger her relationship with the
child's father. In the alternative, where the child resided with
and was supported by the father or his family, the child would
be unable to file a paternity claim against him. Justice O'Connor
concluded that "[tihe risk that the child will find himself
without financial support from his natural father seems as likely
throughout his minority as during the first year of his life."30 In
sum, the state had failed to show any qualities inherent in the
one-year statute of limitations which would demand a different
result were the period longer. 1
In Pickett v. Brown,32 the Court affirmed its decision in
Mills. The Tennessee statute challenged in Pickett was distin-
guishable from the statute invalidated in Mills in two respects.
First, it provided for a two-year limitations period, running from
the date of the child's birth, for the filing of a paternity claim.
Second, the Tennessee statute contained two saving clauses re-
viving a paternity action. The first clause provided for a revival
where the natural father had acknowledged paternity either in
writing or by furnishing support for the child; the second clause
permitted an action to be brought by an appropriate state
agency, or by any person, provided that the child had not
reached the age of eighteen and was, or was liable to become, a
public charge.33
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Brennan found the
Tennessee plan to be violative of equal protection guarantees
under both prongs of the Mills test. Relying on Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion in Mills, Justice Brennan noted
that while Tennessee had alleviated some of the personal obsta-
cles to bringing suit discussed in Mills, supra, the class of illegit-
imate children not covered by either of the two saving clauses
30. Id. at 106.
31. Id.
32. 103 S. Ct. 2199 (1983).
33. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-224(2) (1977).
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still faced substantial barriers in resolving support claims.34 In
addition, the Court concluded that the emotional and financial
factors present during the first year of an illegitimate child's life,
which were noted in Mills as possibly deterring the filing of a
paternity claim, would most likely still be present after two
years. Thus, a two-year limitations period would not provide the
''reasonable opportunity" to bring suit under the first prong of
the Mills test.36
Turning to the second prong of the Mills test, Justice Bren-
nan was similarly able to refute Tennessee's argument that the
two-year period was substantially related to the avoidance of lit-
igating stale or fraudulent claims. Echoing the language in Mills,
Justice Brennan found no evidentiary problems inherent in the
passage of an additional year that would either hamper judicial
process or justify the termination of an illegitimate child's right
to seek support.3 6 Similarly, Justice Brennan pointed out a fun-
damental inconsistency in Tennessee's argument that its limita-
tions period satisfied the second portion of the Mills criteria.
Tennessee had argued that the second saving clause in its stat-
ute, which permitted suit to be brought until the child's eight-
eenth birthday where the child is, or is likely to become, a public
charge, justified a distinction between illegitimate children re-
ceiving public assistance funds and those who did not on
grounds of protection of state revenue. In effect, however, Ten-
nessee had placed illegitimate children receiving public assis-
tance on an equal footing with legitimate children, but had rele-
gated illegitimate children not receiving state funds to an
inferior position. As Justice Brennan concluded:
[A]s the exception for children receiving public assistance
demonstrates, the State perceives no prohibitive problem
in litigating paternity claims throughout a child's minor-
ity. There is no apparent reason why claims filed on be-
half of illegitimate children who are receiving public as-
sistance when they are more than two years old would
not be just as stale, or as vulnerable to fraud, as claims
filed on behalf of illegitimate children who are not public
34. 103 S. Ct. at 2206.
35. Id. at 2206-07.
36. Id. at 2207.
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charges at the same age. The exception in the statute,
therefore, seriously undermines the State's argument...
and compels a conclusion that the two-year limitations
period is not substantially related to a legitimate state
interest.37
A second point undercutting Tennessee's argument was put
forward by the appellant in his brief. According to this argu-
ment, the statutory plan actually contained a strong incentive
which would have the opposite result from what the legislature
had intended. If a non-welfare mother found her claim barred
by the statute of limitations, she could easily revive that claim
by leaving her job and filing for welfare. Thus, the statute not
only provided a means by which the welfare rolls could be in-
creased, but also provided a legal mechanism through which
"staler" claims could be tried: whereas a non-welfare child would
have only two years in which to have a claim filed on his behalf,
a welfare child would have up to an additional sixteen years,
during which that claim would undoubtedly become staler.38
In addition to the foregoing, the Court next considered the
impact of Tennessee's policy of not tolling the statute of limita-
tions in paternity actions despite a general policy to the contrary
in most civil actions.39 Once again, an inconsistency was found in
the Tennessee scheme: while problems of proof may exist with
the passage of time where most civil actions are concerned, Ten-
nessee had "chosen to overlook these problems in favor of pro-
tecting the interests of minors. In paternity and child support
actions brought on behalf of certain illegitimate children, how-
ever, the State instead has chosen to focus on the problems of
proof and to impose on these suits a short limitations period. '40
Drawing on Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Mills, the Court
found that the cumulative effect of the statute failed to demon-
strate that a legitimate state interest was being served.41
37. Id. at 2207-08.
38. See Brief for the Appellant on the Merits (available on LEXIS, Genfed library,
Sup. Ct. Briefs file).
39. 103 S. Ct. at 2208. See also TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-1-106 (1980).
40. Id.
41. Id.
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IL STATE APPROACHES TO LONGER LIMITATIONS PERIODS
Given that the Supreme Court has found equal protection
violations in one- and two-year statutes of limitation, the ques-
tion of equal protection in paternity litigation resolves itself into
a consideration of whether any distinctions between legitimate
and illegitimate children may be possible, and if so, to what ex-
tent the Mills criteria may permit a distinction. The balance of
this note will examine the responses of state courts to equal pro-
tection challenges to longer limitations periods, and the impact
that advances in the quantity and quality of evidence have had
on state arguments in favor of retaining limitations periods.
A. Oregon and Massachusetts
The courts of Oregon and Massachusetts have recently of-
fered strong arguments in favor of the abolition of any classifica-
tion based on illegitimacy where child support is sought. The
Oregon case, State ex. rel. Adult & Family Services Division v.
Bradley,42 involved an equal protection challenge to a six-year
statute of limitations. Applying the Mills criteria, the Supreme
Court of Oregon found that it did not have to consider the first
prong of the test, as under Oregon law no distinction based on
illegitimacy is possible where a right or enforceable obligation
between parent and child exists.43 Under the second prong of
the Mills test, the court noted that whereas Oregon permitted
the establishment of paternity without regard to the child's age
in estate proceedings, it imposed a limitation in support pro-
ceedings. Turning to the argument that problems of proof justi-
fied the regulation of paternity proceedings, the Oregon court
replied that the statutory plan comprised a "heavy-handed sub-
stitute for particularized requirements of proof.""'
The court began this portion of its analysis by focusing on a
42. 295 Or. 216, 666 P.2d 249 (1983). The limitations period challenged in Bradley
was amended after the initial action was filed to provide for a ten-year limitations pe-
riod, but the amendment was not made retroactive. The ten-year period was later re-
pealed by the Oregon Legislative Assembly. 1983 Or. Laws ch. 762, § 3 (repealing OR.
REV. STAT. § 109.135(3) (1981)).
43. See OR. REV. STAT. § 109.060 (1981).
44. See OR. REV. STAT. § 112.105 (1981).
45. 295 Or. at 225, 666 P.2d at 254.
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section of its own state constitution.' While the language of this
section is not identical with that of the fourteenth amendment,
its provision that no law may be passed granting unequal privi-
leges or immunities to any individual or group of its citizens
comports well with the modern view of equal protection under
the federal Constitution in that a legislature cannot sanction
disparate treatment of persons or groups based solely on immu-
table characteristics. 7
The court pointed out a basic inconsistency in the manner
in which Oregon had allocated rights to illegitimate children.
While legitimate and illegitimate children were treated alike
under Oregon law when seeking to establish paternity for pur-
poses of inheritance, the illegitimate child attempting to accom-
plish the same thing for purposes of obtaining support fell into a
birth-related class whose rights were circumscribed by statute. 8
Next, the court considered what weight it should accord the ob-
vious evidentiary distinction between legitimate and illegitimate
children seeking support, namely, the need to prove paternity.
Expanding on its reading of Oregon's constitution, the court
ruled that any restrictions on an illegitimate child's ability to
establish paternity "must be imposed only for reasons relating
specifically to the proof problems encountered in paternity de-
terminations."' 9 Viewed under this additional inquiry, the court
concluded that a discrete time period was more arbitrary and
burdensome than it was specifically related to ensuring either
fairness or accuracy in paternity suits, and was therefore uncon-
stitutional.50 In support of this conclusion, the court reiterated
the inconsistent dichotomy existing in Oregon's statutory ap-
proach to filiation rights, discussed supra, and observed that a
finite period for asserting paternity was unrelated to the ongoing
duty of parental support. This portion of the court's reasoning
drew on the statement of the Supreme Court of Florida in State
Department of Health v. West, 51 which suggested that a time
46. Id. at 223, 666 P.2d at 253 (citing OR. CONST. art. I, § 20). See also Sterling v.
Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 625 P.2d 123 (1981).
47. See, e.g., University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
48. 295 Or. at 223-24, 666 P.2d at 253.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. 378 So.2d 1220 (Fla. 1979), See also County of Lenoir ex. rel. Cogdell v. Johnson,
46 N.C. App. 182, 264 S.E.2d 816 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980).
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limitation on the right of an illegitimate child to determine pa-
ternity as a prerequisite to obtaining support was illogical be-
cause the right to support is self-renewing until the child reaches
its majority. Therefore, the claim cannot become stale and sub-
ject to limitation by the state.
The rule announced in Bradley departs somewhat from the
degree and scope of the equal protection inquiry under Mills
and Pickett. The narrow focus of the Oregon court on the evi-
dentiary problems distinctive to paternity proceedings, and its
conclusion that a discrete time limit was unrelated to either ac-
curacy or fairness, suggests that where paternity is sought to en-
force a support obligation, any limitation on the ability to bring
a paternity claim should be subject to strict judicial scrutiny in-
sofar as it infringes on the arguably fundamental right of a child
to receive parental support. It can thus be argued that under the
Oregon approach, no statute of limitations in paternity actions
would pass constitutional muster.
Unlike Oregon, Massachusetts has a well-developed body of
law favoring the absence of any statute of limitations in pater-
nity actions. In Commonwealth v. Gruttner,52 the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court re-examined its policy in the context of a criminal
nonsupport complaint. The defendants in Gruttner had argued
that the applicable statute of limitations had already run, and
thus the prosecution was barred. The court responded that Mas-
sachusetts had not recognized a limitations period in paternity
cases since 1865, and had made nonsupport a criminal offense
since 1913.1'
Turning to the narrow question of whether any limitation
should apply in the situation where paternity was the first step
towards obtaining support, the court reaffirmed its position that
no statute of limitations should apply to paternity proceedings.5
Supporting this view, the court reasoned that it "was extremely
reluctant . . . to visit upon such a person a time bar which re-
sults in loss of support, largely due to inaction or neglect by
others. 5 5 Adopting the same logic employed in the West and
Bradley cases, supra, the court stated that the passage of time
52. 385 Mass. 474, 432 N.E.2d 518 (1982).
53. Id. at 478, 432 N.E.2d at 520.
54. Id. at 479, 432 N.E.2d at 521.
55. Id.
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was not related to the adjudication of paternity, and that the
applicable rules of evidence amply protected the putative fa-
ther's rights. The court's holding on the issue of nonsupport,
however, took the West and Bradley analysis one step further:
because the support obligation is deemed to be continuous
throughout a child's minority, and Massachusetts' criminal non-
support statute of limitations had previously been interpreted as
running from the date of the last violation of the statute," any
nonsupport claim alleging continuous nonsupport may be
brought at "any time during the child's minority, and during the
period six years thereafter. 57
B. Michigan and Pennsylvania
While Oregon and Massachusetts have demonstrated a more
liberal interpretation of their respective statutes of limitations in
paternity cases, other courts have upheld their statutes in the
face of post-Mills and Pickett equal protection challenges.The
courts of Michigan and Pennsylvania fall into this category, as
each has upheld its respective six-year statute both prior and
subsequent to Mills.
One of the earlier cases, McFetridge v. Chiado,58 which did
not consider Mills, held that the Michigan six-year limitations
period did not "work an unfairness of constitutional magni-
tude." ' The six-year period, the majority believed, was substan-
tially related to the state's interest in avoiding stale and fraudu-
lent claims and thus justified unequal treatment. The majority
further stated that the statute did not create an unreasonable
barrier to adjudication, as an action could be maintained by a
child's mother, the putative father or the state department of
social services. The court, however, refused to recognize the
child's right to seek a declaratory judgment on its own behalf.6 0
The dissenting opinion reiterated the view that limiting an ille-
gitimate child's right to seek support was both a clear violation
56. See Commonwealth v. MacKenzie, 368 Mass. 613, 334 N.E.2d 613 (1975).
57. Gruttner, 385 Mass. at 481, 432 N.E.2d at 522.
58. 116 Mich. App. 528, 323 N.W.2d 470 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
59. Id. at 531, 323 N.W.2d at 471.
60. Id.
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and not so substantially related to any state interest as to justify
disparate treatment.6 1
The majority view in McFetridge has been upheld by the
Michigan Court of Appeals in light of both Mills and Pickett. In
Shifter v. Wolf,62 a post-Mills decision, the court repeated its
view that Michigan's statute was substantially related to a per-
missible state interest.6  More recently, in Daniel v. Collier,6 4
the court of appeals clarified its position. The original judgment
in Daniel,6" relied upon in both McFetridge and Shifter, was ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court, which vacated the judgment for
reconsideration in light of Pickett." On remand, the Michigan
court again declined to find any equal protection violation in the
six-year limitations statute.6 ' It contended that a six-year pe-
riod, unlike the one- and two-year periods reviewed by the Su-
preme Court, is long enough for the economic and social disrup-
tions surrounding the birth of an illegitimate child to have been
overcome or to have sufficiently subsided to allow suit to be
brought either by the child's mother or guardian.6 8 Rejecting the
view that an action by an illegitimate child seeking support
could be maintained at any time during a child's minority, the
court found that the limitations period was substantially related
to the evidentiary problems inherent in paternity cases.
In support of its position, the court cited Justice Rehn-
quist's statement in Mills that "[p]aternal support suits on be-
half of illegitimate children contain an element that such suits
for the legitimate children do not contain: proof of paternity.
Such proof is often sketchy and strongly contested, frequently
turning upon conflicting testimony from only two witnesses."6 9
It concluded that since the equal protection clause did not man-
date that legitimate and illegitimate children have co-extensive
61. Id. at 531-39, 323 N.W.2d at 471-75.
62. 120 Mich. App. 182, 327 N.W.2d 429 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983). See also Wolfe v.
Geno, 122 Mich. App. 252, 332 N.W.2d 457 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
63. Id. at 184, 327 N.W.2d at 430-31.
64. 130 Mich. App. 345, 343 N.W.2d 16 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
65. 113 Mich. App. 74, 317 N.W.2d 293 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
66. Daniel v. Collier, 104 S. Ct. 53 (1983).
67. 130 Mich. App. at 346, 343 N.W.2d at 16. Accord, Wolfe v. Geno, 134 Mich. App.
433, 351 N.W.2d 316 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
68. 130 Mich. App. at 348, 343 N.W.2d at 17. Contra District of Columbia ex. rel.
W.J.D. v. E.M., 467 A.2d 457 (D.C. 1983).
69. 130 Mich. App. at 348, 343 N.W.2d at 17-18 (quoting Mills, 456 U.S. at 97).
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rights to paternal support 7 0 the six-year statute thus satisfied
the Mills and Pickett criteria.71
In accord with Michigan's view, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania upheld its six-year statute in Astemborski v. Sus-
marski.72 In its reading of Mills, the Pennsylvania court stressed
Justice Rehnquist's observation, quoted supra, that while the
state must provide adequate opportunities for illegitimate chil-
dren to seek support, evidentiary problems justified a limitation
of actions when related to the state's interest.73 The court then
asserted that its six-year period was "of such greater duration as
to negate birth-related circumstances" as elaborated on in
Mills.7 ' Turning to the second prong of the Mills test, while the
court relied on Justice Rehnquist's analysis, its conclusion ap-
pears to contradict the thrust of that analysis. Justice Rehn-
quist's observation turned on the realization that in paternity
cases, testimony was typically available from only two wit-
nesses. 75 Yet, the Pennsylvania court declared its limitations pe-
riod to be substantially related to the deterrence of stale and
fraudulent claims, arguing that "a lapse of more than six years
may reasonably be expected to coincide with prejudice to the
defense through loss of evidence, the death or disappearance of
witnesses, and the fading of memories. '76 While such arguments
are more appropriate in other civil cases, in a paternity case the
loss of evidence would make it more difficult for the petitioner
to meet the burden of proof. The problem with witnesses seems
slight where paternity is in question, and, given Justice Rehn-
quist's analysis, any diminution of memory appears to be rela-
tively minor where third parties are not generally involved.
The decision in Astemborski, like the Daniel v. Collier deci-
sion, was vacated and remanded upon appeal to the Supreme
Court.77 In accord with the reasoning advanced in Daniel and in
its first decision in Astemborski, the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania found sufficient distinctions between its position and that
70. Id. at 349, 343 N.W.2d at 17-18.
71. Id.
72. 499 Pa. 99, 451 A.2d 1012 (1982).
73. Id. at 104-05, 451 A.2d at 1013-14.
74. Id. at 104, 451 A.2d at 1014.
75. See Mills, 456 U.S. at 97.
76. Id.
77. 103 S. Ct. 3105 (1983).
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of the Supreme Court in Pickett to reinstate its previous order.7"
C. New York
While New York has historically been among the more pro-
gressive states in the area of protecting the rights of children,1 9
the recent reaction of its courts and legislature illustrates the
type of revisions in the law that stem from Mills and Pickett.
Prior to the Court's decision in Mills, New York had a statute of
limitations for instituting paternity proceedings which was sub-
stantially similar to the Tennessee statute challenged in Pickett;
both provided for a two-year limitations period, and both con-
tained a saving clause extending this period where public assis-
tance funds are involved.80 In February of 1983, however, legisla-
tion was introduced in the state senate extending the period to
five years, but making no other alterations."1 The memorandum
in support of the amendment stated the bill's purpose as estab-
lishing "a constitutional statute of limitations for the initiation
of paternity proceedings, ' 82 and justified its provisions by argu-
ing that, based on Mills, the Supreme Court might find the ex-
isting New York statute unconstitutional. The memorandum
further contended that the proposed limitations period would be
able to meet the Mills criteria.8 3 On June 17, 1983, eleven days
after the Pickett case was decided, a New York family court
judge ruled that Pickett mandated invalidation of the existing
statute.84 On June 21, the amendment to section 517(a) of the
New York Family Court Act was signed into law.8 5 Almost im-
mediately, the amendment was challenged on equal protection
grounds in a pending paternity suit. The decision in that case,
78. 502 Pa. 409, 466 A.2d 1018 (1983).
79. See generally Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
80. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 517 (McKinney 1982). Unlike Tennessee, New York tolled
the statute where the mother was under the age of eighteen, and only permitted suit by a
public welfare official prior to the child's tenth birthday.
81. The original draft of the bill had provided for a six-year limitations period.
82. Memorandum in support obtained from the Office of Court Administration, Uni-
fied Court System, State of New York.
83. Id.
84. Matter of Esther W. v. Melvin H., 119 Misc.2d 690, 464 N.Y.S.2d 667 (N.Y. Fam.
Ct. 1983).
85. 1983 N.Y. Laws ch. 305.
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Matter of Patricia R.,86 invalidated the amendment. The family
court judge found that five years was generally an adequate pe-
riod in which the mother could overcome the pressures attend-
ant upon the birth of an illegitimate child, 7 but also found that
the amendment did not satisfy the second prong of the Mills
test.88 Based on its interpretation of Pickett, the court noted two
basic similarities between the New York and Tennessee statutes
which compelled the conclusion that the amended statute was
not substantially related to the state's interest in avoiding stale
and fraudulent claims. First, the amended statute still retained
in one of its saving clauses an extension of the limitations period
where suit was brought by the Commissioner of Social Services,
a scheme flatly rejected in Pickett.8 9 Second, New York, like
Tennessee, had chosen to exempt paternity actions from its gen-
eral rule of tolling actions during a child's minority. Although
New York provided an additional saving clause tolling the stat-
ute during the period, if any, that the mother was still a minor,
this did not eliminate the tolling defect present under Pickett.9°
III. THE ROLE OF GENETIC TESTING
Perhaps the single most important development in pater-
nity litigation has not been legal, but medical. Advances in blood
testing, specifically the Human Leucocyte Antigen (HLA) test,
have provided what may be the necessary evidentiary supple-
ment to paternity cases that can eliminate their traditional dis-
tinction from other civil actions. Briefly stated, the HLA test
differs from other standard tests in that it is not a blood test,
but rather is a tissue typing test. While the genetic loci for
which HLA tests are present in many body tissues, the most
convenient medium by which a tissue sample can be obtained is
a blood sample, as these genetic markers are present on white
blood cells, or leucocytes. In contrast, other blood tests focus on
genetic markers present on red blood cells.9 ' Whereas the famil-
86. 120 Misc.2d 986, 466 N.Y.S.2d 994 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1983).
87. Id. at 990-91, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 998.
88. Id., 466 N.Y.S.2d at 998.
89. Id. at 991, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 998.
90. Id.
91. See Terasaki, Resolution by HLA Testing of 1000 Paternity Cases Not Excluded
by ABO Testing, 16 J. FAM. L. 543 (1982), and Miale, Jennings, Rettberg, Sell & Krause,
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iar ABO and Rh tests yield a cumulative probability of exclusion
of between 33% and 37 %, depending on racial group, and the
six most common red cell tests yield a cumulative probability of
between 63% and 72%, the addition of the HLA test raises this
figure to between 91 % and 93%.92 Through further serological
testing, sometimes combined with electrophoretic techniques,
which isolate specific blood proteins, the exclusion rate can ex-
ceed 98%.0' In practice, once a court orders a series of blood
tests to be made, a testing laboratory or the court's own blood
testing unit will take samples from the mother, child, and puta-
tive father. The samples are then typed according to the six
most common red cell tests (ABO, Rh, MNS, Kell, Duffy, and
Kidd). 94 If the red cell series do not exclude the putative father,
HLA tests for specific blood protein systems are then performed.
Historically, blood test results were only received into evi-
dence for the purpose of excluding paternity. The rationale for
doing so was to prevent potentially prejudicial use of test results
that resulted in non-exclusion of paternity. 95 At present, how-
ever, only three states-Connecticut, Mississippi and West Vir-
ginia-still follow this rule.96 In contrast, thirty-four states have
approved, by statute, procedures that permit introduction of
blood test results into evidence as proof of paternity. 7
Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines: Present Status of Serologic Testing in Problems of Dis-
puted Parentage, 10 FAM. L.Q. 247 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Joint AMA-ABA
Guidelines].
92. See Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines, supra note 91, at 257-58. Individually, HLA
can only yield a mean probability of exclusion of between 78% and 80%.
93. See Lauter, Paternity: The Final Word, Natl. L.J., Sept. 12, 1983.
94. See Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines, supra note 91, at 257-63.
95. Perhaps the most famous example of the abuse of early blood tests occurred in
the case of Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App.2d 652, 169 P.2d 442 (1946), in which Charlie
Chaplin lost a paternity suit although he had type 0 blood, the plaintiff had type A
blood, and the child had type B blood. For the child to have type B blood, at least one
parent had to have type B blood. Nevertheless, the California District Court of Appeal
upheld the judgment of Chaplin's paternity.
96. See Lauter, supra note 93, p.28, cols. 3 & 4. See also infra note 97.
97. See e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-3 (Cum. Supp. 1984); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-847
(1982); CAL. EVID. CODE § 895 (West Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-126 (Cum.
Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-45 (Cum. Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 7-1115, 1116
(Cum. Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 40, Par. 1401, § 1 (Cum. Supp. 1984-5); IND.
CODE § 31-6-6.1-8 (Cum. Supp. 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 675.41 (West Supp. 1984-5); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 406.111 (Bobbs-Merrill 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:396 (West Cum.
Supp. 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 280 (Cum. Supp. 1983-84); MD. FAM. LAW
CODE ANN. § 66 G (Cum. Supp. 1983); MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 25.496 (1984); MINN. STAT.
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To date, the Supreme Court has recognized the highly pro-
bative value of HLA testing when combined with the six red cell
systems as suggested by the Joint AMA-ABA Study. In Little v.
Streater,9 8 the Court found the blood test procedure, discussed
supra, to be so important to the adjudication of paternity that it
held that a Connecticut statute imposing the costs of those tests
on the moving party constituted a denial of due process where
that party was indigent.9 9 Although the Court in Little agreed
that the blood tests suggested by the Joint AMA-ABA guide-
lines were highly effective in excluding falsely accused putative
fathers, in Mills it declined to hold that modern testing tech-
niques negated the state's interest in avoiding stale and fraudu-
lent claims.100 In Pickett, however, the Court softened its posi-
tion, concluding that "advances in blood testing render more
attenuated the relationship between a statute of limitations and
the State's interest in preventing the prosecution of stale or
fraudulent paternity claims."101 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court placed great emphasis on the ability of modern blood tests
to alleviate the problems of proof existing in paternity cases.102
Although approving of the use of HLA testing when com-
bined with red cell tests, the Court left to the states the task of
determining the proper evidentiary weight to be assigned to
blood test results. At the state level, once admissibility of HLA
test results has been established,10 3 it is typically argued that
because the results are expressed in terms of probability, undue
prejudice against the putative father is likely to result. The
ANN. § 257.62 (West Supp. 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-6-112, 113 (1983); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 126.131 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-52 (West Cum. Supp. 1984-85); N.Y. FAM.
CT. ACT § 532 (McKinney 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-11 (Supp. 1983); OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 3111.09, 3111.10 (Page 1983); ORE. REV. STAT. § 109.258 (1977-78 Repl.);
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6131 et. seq. (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1984); TENN. CODE ANN. §
24-7-112 (Repl. 1983); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 13.02-06 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1983);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45a-10 (Repl. 1977); VA. CODE § 20.61.2 (Cure. Supp. 1984); WASH.
REV. CODE § 26.26.110 (Cum. Supp. 1984-85); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 767.48 (West 1981);
WYO. STAT. § 14-2-110 (a)(iii) (1977). See also Lauter, supra note 93.
98. 452 U.S. 1 (1981).
99. Id. at 16.
100. 456 U.S. 91, 98 n.4 (1982).
101. 103 S. Ct. 2199, 2208 (1983).
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Owens v. Bell, 6 Ohio St.3d 46, 451 N.E.2d 241 (1983), Cutchember v.
Payne, 466 A.2d 1240 (D.C. 1983).
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question of what weight should be given to this statistical evi-
dence in paternity cases has been addressed by several courts. In
Cramer v. Morrison,10 4 one of the earliest cases in this area, the
California Court of Appeal ruled that HLA test results, which
indicated a 98.3% probability of paternity, constituted highly
probative and admissible evidence on the issue of paternity and
that its inclusion would not result in undue prejudice toward the
putative father. 105
The court based its ruling in part on the holding of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in People v. Collins."°6 In Collins, the de-
fendant's robbery conviction was reversed due to the prejudicial
use of statistical data presented by the prosecution, which had
concluded that the probability of any two individuals with the
two defendants' six identifying characteristics was one in twelve
million. The error in Collins was that the prosecution failed to
establish a basis for the individual probabilities of the specific
characteristics in question, and also failed to establish that any
of the characteristics were mutually independent of each other,
an indispensible prerequisite for the resulting probability to be
considered reliable. Turning to the facts in Cramer, the court
noted in that case that HLA test results "are not based on arbi-
trarily assigned numerical probabilities or on a statistical theory
unsupported by the evidence. Instead, they are based on objec-
tively ascertainable data and a statistical theory based on scien-
tific research and experiment. 10 7 As to the potential for error,
the court contended that it was not "possible to exclude all pos-
104. 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1979).
105. Id. at 884-85, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 871-72.
106. 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968).
107. 88 Cal. App. 3d at 884, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 872. When the Joint AMA-ABA Guide-
lines were first promulgated, statistical data for certain genetic markers was provided
only for the white, black, and Japanese populations. The objectivity of the available data
has not gone unchallenged. For example, in Alicia C. v. Evaristo G., 115 Misc. 2d 564,
454 N.Y.S. 2d 395 (N.Y. Far. Ct. 1982), the family court judge ruled that the HLA test
results could not be admitted into evidence on the basis that the selected criteria were
too arbitrary. The putative father, who was of Hispanic origin, had been classified by the
expert who performed the test as Caucasian, because reliable data had yet to be devel-
oped for the Hispanic population. The expert admitted in his testimony that the His-
panic population was far more heterogeneous than the Caucasian population. On appeal,
the decision was reversed on the ground that racial characteristics went only to the
weight, rather than the admissibility, of the evidence. 93 A.D. 2d 820, 460 N.Y.S. 2d 616
(N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
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sible chance for error . . . . [b]ut there is no requirement in our
law that the admissibility of scientific test evidence must be
predicated on a 100 percent degree of accuracy."'0 8
The approach in Cramer, while clearly the majority view on
this point, 0 9 has been subsequently refined. An example of this
refinement, and how it relates to a determination of paternity,
was demonstrated in a recent New York case, Matter of Sara H.
v. Bart D." ° In Sara H., the petitioner testified that she had had
sexual relations with the respondent approximately nine months
prior to the birth of her child, and had not had sexual relations
with any other man during the three months prior to the
claimed date of conception, or during the following month. The
respondent admitted to having engaged in sexual relations once
with the petitioner, but maintained that the act had occurred
approximately one year before the birth of the child. In support
of his contentions, the respondent, a police sergeant, introduced
police records indicating that he could not have been present at
the place of conception at the time and date that the petitioner
claimed. The court discounted the probative value of the police
records on the grounds that there was little evidence to support
their accuracy, and because the respondent's testimony indi-
cated that he had had sufficient access to the records to be able
to alter them.
The results of the blood tests ordered by the court esti-
mated the probability of the respondent's paternity at 99.2%.
The respondent challenged the probative value of the test re-
sults, arguing that they could only demonstrate the "likelihood
that a man with the [genetic] phenotype of the respondent
would contribute the required genes compared with the likeli-
hood that a random man of the same ethnic group would do so,"
but could not demonstrate paternity."' The upshot of this argu-
ment would be that the statistical expression of the blood test
results would have to be applied as part of quantification of all
the evidence in the case by application of Bayes' Theorem, a sta-
tistical test that estimates the conditional probability that a
given combination of events will occur where one event has oc-
108. 88 Cal. App. 3d at 884, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
109. See Crain v. Crain, 104 Idaho 666, 662 P.2d 538, (1983).
110. 121 Misc. 2d 425, 467 N.Y.S. 2d 1001 (N.Y. Fan. Ct. 1983).
111. Id. at 429, 467 N.Y.S. 2d at 1003.
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curred and the other potential events are mutually exclusive.
The court rejected the respondent's argument, which would
have severely restricted the application of the blood test results.
The court's premise was that it could not accept the respon-
dent's contention, as it had to rule according to a non-quantifi-
able standard of proof.112 Application of complex statistical tests
would be worthless to a determination of paternity, because it
would require the trier of fact to ascertain the individual
probabilities of all the elements of proof.113 An order of filiation
was entered. The court explained that while the ultimate
probability of paternity could not be calculated with exactitude,
all judicial determinations must involve the consideration of
multiple conditional probabilities, whether or not they are quan-
tifiable.' In the instant case, the court found that the combina-
tion of the blood test results, which indicated a strong
probability of paternity, the respondent's testimony that he had
had sexual relations with the petitioner at the approximate time
of conception, and the court's finding that the petitioner was the
more credible witness, while not amounting to an ultimate
probability of paternity, did meet the burden of proof that the
evidence be "clear, convincing, and entirely satisfactory. '"1 ,
5
The reasoning advanced in both Cramer and Sara H. has
particular significance for both legislatures and courts seeking to
determine whether paternity actions should be limited, and if so,
to what extent. While HLA test results cannot independently
provide sufficient proof of paternity, their probative value is of
such weight that the imposition of an arbitrary limitations pe-
riod counteracts much of their ability to further the asserted
state interests of avoiding stale and fraudulent claims. HLA
testing goes directly to the question of avoiding stale claims by
providing a court with access to probative evidence which re-
mains unaltered over any time period and is based on objective
scientific data. In addition, it goes to the question of avoiding
fraudulent claims by providing an accurate and efficient method
112. Id. at 430, 467 N.Y.S. 2d at 1004.
113. Id. at 430-32, 467 N.Y.S. 2d at 1004-05.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 433, 467 N.Y.S. 2d at 1005. See also Matter of Dorn HH v. Lawrence II,
31 N.Y. 2d 154, 286 N.E. 2d 717, 335 N.Y.S. 2d 274 (1972), Matter of Patricia A. v.
Philip DeG., 88 A.D. 2d 911, 450 N.Y.S. 2d 567 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
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by which a meritless claim may either be deterred or dismissed
prior to trial.
IV. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the asserted state justifications for
limiting paternity actions beyond the two-year period invali-
dated in Pickett raise serious equal protection questions. While
illegitimacy has yet to be deemed a "suspect" classification, ap-
plication of intermediate or middle-tier scrutiny has provided an
analytical framework which presents a formidable challenge to
any defense of a limitations period. The establishment of pater-
nity is the establishment of legal rights and obligations. As has
been shown, many states have already made legislative determi-
nations that it is possible to litigate paternity claims over ex-
tended periods where public revenue is being protected. Several
states have also advanced the view that the establishment of pa-
ternity is the establishment of, inter alia, the legal duty to sup-
port a child; as this duty is continuous throughout the minority
of a legitimate child, equal protection demands nothing less
when the child is illegitimate. Finally, the availability of accu-
rate and objective evidence in the form of blood tests operates to
extend the time period after which a claim may be deemed to be
stale or prejudicial to a defendant. Although states may contend
that limitations periods help deter stale and fraudulent claims,
this interest cannot be deemed a substantial one, as it is eclipsed
by the state interests in seeing that justice is done, that legal
duties of support are enforced, and that the public revenue be
protected. As such, extension of existing limitations periods can
only serve state interests; their retention fails to satisfy interme-
diate scrutiny.
Robert Wanerman
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